Those who have the nukes or the upper hand can act out of bluster and end any disagreement with a commando raid or a missile strike. Many cascading world events have shown it is not always a realistic way to subdue a wiggly threat.
Latching on his experience in the military and several bodies that brokered an end to many disputes, Indonesian Ambassador to the Philippines Agus Widjojo reflects on dealing with an ideological opposite, and offers a tone-deaf, more pragmatic exit to a conflict: diplomacy.
Growing up, did you ever envision yourself becoming an ambassador someday?
I’m not a career diplomat. I’m a political appointee. After I had retired in 2003 from active military duties, I was appointed as ambassador in 2021. I had various assignments that provided me opportunities and interactions with the international community. I have attended military schools overseas. I was also part of the Indonesian Batallion to United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai and the International Commission of Control and Supervision in 1973.
How different is your role as a diplomat to a military role?
In the military, everything, especially the task, is highly structured. The criteria for an accomplished mission are very clear, and there is a distinct difference between failure and success. You have to adhere to discipline. (This is off the record: You, civilians, never have discipline! Ha Ha Ha Ha!) I have had some bypassing experience in interacting with non-military environment. Also, a little politics when I was in the national assembly.
Diplomacy is another professional domain. Here, you have to work with what you have. You cannot be ideal. International negotiations take a very long time. Peace negotiations, moreover. In international relations and negotiations, you cannot force yourself to achieve what you want. Tomorrow is another day.
How is Indonesia contributing to the achievement of lasting peace in the Bangsamoro?
I have high respect for the government of the Philippines regarding the result of its policies. To achieve any peace process is not easy. Remember Marawi? The government of the Philippines was able to put it out in a relatively short time and effectively. (The insurgents) were fully armed.
You have a special institution for peace and reconciliation and national unity. That is interesting. We can learn a lot from there. It is a continuous process not only in bringing peace or violence to an end, but how to maintain peace that has been achieved.
In Indonesia, we have the Aceh Peace Process (with a separatist group that fought for the independence of the Aceh region in Sumatra between 1976 and 2005). We were able to successfully negotiate with the assistance of the President of Finland. The negotiation process was held in Helsinki.
There are several principles that we need to familiarize ourselves in if we go to the negotiation table and try to find a common point to agree upon.
As a neighboring country, we have trust in the policies of the government of the Philippines. The government knows what it is doing. We would provide any assistance we can extend.
Should the state negotiate with terrorists?
Nothing is impossible to negotiate with whomever if we familiarize ourselves with the principles of negotiation and implement them.
That lies in the domain of the science and art of governance or statecraft. It’s a matter of finding what is actually the cause of opposition. Why do they rebel? How do you find a consensus?
I was also tasked as one of the Indonesian commissioners in the Commission of Truth and Friendship between Indonesia and Timor Leste.
During that time, Indonesia, especially the military, was accused of gross violation of human rights. We tried to find an ending to that.
There was a referendum in New York under the supervision of the United Nations. The purpose of that commission was to establish friendships between the peoples of Indonesia and Timor, which eventually became the independent Democratic Republic of Timor Leste. I learned a lot from that negotiation.
You have books on how the military figured in the making of Indonesia as a nation.
I have two. One is a compilation of my articles about transforming the Indonesian military from guerilla-fighters military to a modern professional military under a democratic political system. It gives a wider background to how I carried out those reforms.
Most people thought that the political role of the Indonesian military was caused by its hunger for power. It’s not. It’s because the Indonesian military was (borne out of) a nation in arms. Most of the times, there were no distinct dividing line between politics and military. That’s why the military had various and frequent experiences to be, in itself, the government in the past.
For instance, in various military emergencies, the military becomes the military emergency government, where the civilian government (during that time we didn’t have a country yet) is being put aside for the time being. It resembles Martial Law.
I wanted to achieve a military clean of political role, a professional institution with the main purpose of defending the country from external threats. The military is employed by the President. The commanding general of the military cannot decide for itself because the commanding general of the military is never elected by the people. That is the democratic principle.
How do you unspool a tussle as complicated as the West Philippine Sea? Should anybody interfere with the sovereign affairs of any state? More so, is it imperative that smaller states challenge a conventional military power?
I don’t think going into armed conflict would benefit any of the parties.
We see the overplay of territories where the countries involved try to negotiate: China and Asean member-states are talking in different languages.
Asean member-states talk in the language of international laws (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). For China, the area is historic fishing ground.
The parties need to finetune their frequencies in the same language.
Plus, it is not merely about the position of Asean member-states and China because there’s additional regional power rivalry between China and the US.
It should not cause any misinterpretation. Unintended consequences are bad enough; intended consequences, worse.