Time and again, I have emphasized the importance of strict adherence to procedural rules. Again, no matter how meritorious your case is, if you do not follow procedure, it can be dismissed on a mere technicality. That will be a crushing defeat; a knockout punch in the very first round. Your time, resources, and effort, all go down the drain. All for nothing.
Specifically, I talk about sending a demand to your obstinate lessee before filing an ejectment suit. Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the ejectment suit “shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessees, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises of no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after 15 days in the case of land or five days in the case of buildings.” Failure to comply, even if the lessor has all the right to dispossess the lessee, will result in the dismissal.
Such is what happened in Velia J. Cruz v. Spouses Maximo and Susan Christensen (G.R. 205539 promulgated 4 October 2017). Petitioner Velia Cruz inherited property from her mother. Respondent Spouses Maximo and Susan Christensen already leased said property from her mother during her lifetime. Ms. Cruz, upon her mother’s passing, thus became the spouses’ lessor. In time, lessees failed repeatedly to pay rent. Thus, Ms. Cruz was constrained to demand that the lessees vacate the property and pay all unpaid rentals. The parties met at the barangay for conciliation. No settlement was inked. Three years later, Ms. Cruz finally sent a demand letter to vacate the property and pay the rental arrears. There being a refusal still by the lessees, Ms. Cruz was constrained to file an ejectment suit.
At the trial court, Ms. Christensen admitted the lease but made an issue out of the demand letter. She denied having received it and claimed she did not know whose signature appeared on the letter, allegedly receiving it on her behalf. The court, on account of this ground, dismissed the case. It opined that since it was not established who received the demand letter, it could not be said that the lessee received it. Thus, a failure to comply with the demand requirement.
Upon dismissal, Ms. Cruz wasted no time appealing to the next level of court. The Regional Trial Court on appeal, gave her the nod. It gave due course to her appeal and required the lessee to vacate the premises and pay the unpaid rentals. Respondent spouses’ turn to go up. The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the dismissal by the trial court. Thus, Ms. Cruz had no other recourse but to go up to the final bulwark of justice. Among the issues raised was the sufficiency of the demand; or if such is necessary in the first place.
In ruling in favor of petitioner Cruz, the Supreme Court declared, “[T]he property in this case is owned by petitioner. Respondents had a month-to-month lease with the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. Petitioner contends that no prior demand was necessary in this case since her Complaint was premised on the expiration of respondent’s lease, not on the failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease.
“The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on the termination of the lease due to expiration of the terms of the contract. The complaint must be brought on the allegation that the lease has expired and the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate, not on the allegation that the lessee failed to pay rents. The cause of action which would give rise to an ejectment case would be the expiration of the lease. Thus, the requirement under Rule 70, Section 2 of a prior ‘demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate’ would be unnecessary. xxx xxx
“However, the respondents’ Answer to the Complaint is telling. Respondents admit that they only had a month-to-month lease since 1969. They contend that they had been continuously paying their monthly rent until sometime in 2002 when the petitioner refused to receive it. Thus, as early as 2002, the petitioner, as the lessor, already refused to renew respondents’ month-to-month verbal lease. Therefore, the respondent’s lease had already long expired before the petitioner sent her demand letters.
“Respondents cannot feign ignorance of petitioner’s demand to vacate since the matter was brought to barangay conciliation proceedings in 2005. The barangay certification issued on 11 August 2005, shows that no compromise was reached between the parties.”
“Therefore, the respondents’ insistence on the non-receipt of the demand letter is misplaced. Their verbal lease over the property had already expired sometime in 2002. xxx xxx The demand letter would have been unnecessary since respondents’ continued refusal to vacate despite the expiration of their verbal lease was sufficient ground to bring the action.”
Clear as day. Another good distinction learned. If the ground is the expiration of the lease, no demand is needed. In case you as a landlord, are in a like situation, you know that no demand before the institution will not be a fatal infirmity.
Sources:
- Section 2, Rule 70, Rules of Court
- Velia J. Cruz v. Spouses Maximo and Susan Christensen as cited above